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Resolving the “Bayesian Paradox”—Bayesians Who Failed to
Solve Bayesian Problems
A well-supported conclusion a reader would draw from the vast amount of research on Bayesian
inference could be distilled into one sentence: “People are profoundly Bayesians, but they fail to
solve Bayesian word problems.” Indeed, two strands of research tell different stories about our
ability tomake Bayesian inferences—our ability to infer posterior probability from prior probability
and new evidence according to Bayes’s theorem. People see, move, coordinate, remember, learn,
reason and argue consistently with complex probabilistic Bayesian computations, but they fail to
solve, computationally much simpler, Bayesian word problems.
On the one hand, a first strand of research shows that people are profoundly Bayesians.
Strong evidence indicates that the brain represents probability distributions and certain neural
circuits perform Bayesian computations (Pouget et al., 2013). Bayesian computation models
account for a wide range of observations on sensory perception, motoric behavior and
sensorimotor coordination (see Chater et al., 2010; Pouget et al., 2013). Bayesian computations
approximate observed patterns in inductive reasoning, memory, language production, and
language comprehension (Chater et al., 2010). Even 12-month-old preverbal infants present
behavior consistent with the behavior of a Bayesian ideal observer: infants integrate multiple
sources of information to form rational expectations about situations they have never encountered
before (Téglás et al., 2011). In everyday life, people form cognitive judgments predicting the
occurrence of everyday events consistent with a Bayesian ideal observer (Griffiths and Tenenbaum,
2006).
On the other hand, however, a second strand of research shows that people fail to make the
simplest possible Bayesian inference once they are presented with Bayesian word problems. Indeed,
people tend to largely ignore or neglect base-rate information in probability judgment tasks such as
social judgment or textbook problem tasks (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973; Bar-Hillel, 1980) or they
tend to fail to be Bayesians in a completely opposite way—by overweighting base-rate information
(Teigen and Keren, 2007). In fact, people require costly and intense training with most statistical
formats to achieve good performance with probabilistic inferences that deteriorates with time very
quickly (Sedlmeier and Gigerenzer, 2001).
So people are Bayesians who fail to solve simple Bayesian word problems. As with
most paradoxes, a solution to this “Bayesian paradox” lies in taking closer look at
conceptualizations: at what constitutes a Bayesian inference in these two strands of research.
Such analysis uncovers important design differences, Bayesian classification criteria and
statistical approaches (Vallée-Tourangeau et al., 2015). However, the crucial difference that we
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highlight here lies in the cognitive processes involved in
performing the task. What is described as a “Bayesian inference”
in the two strands conflates very different processes. Implicit
processes—implicit calculations with probabilities mostly
acquired from experience—are involved in the Bayesian
computations approximating the performance of various
cognitive functions and in the estimation of experienced real-
life outcomes. Explicit processes—explicit calculations with
probabilities typically extracted from a textual description—are
involved in solving Bayesian textbook problems or social
judgment problems. The different information source,
experience or description, for example, has been shown to
lead to dramatically different choices and decisions (e.g., Hertwig
et al., 2004). With this distinction, of course, we do not intend
to imply that all the cognitive processes involved in estimating
probabilities are necessarily implicit and engage only with the
probabilities from experience or vice versa. Rather we wish to
point out that the different experimental paradigms outlined
here require typically different cognitive processes operating
over different types of information.
This postulated distinction between cognitive processes
involved in these different types of Bayesian inference tasks
can be mapped onto a distinction between biologically primary
(pan-cultural, evolutionary purposeful) cognitive abilities and
biologically secondary (culturally specific) cognitive abilities
(Geary, 1995). It could also be linked to the debate on how people
form probability judgments, either through automatic frequency
encoding of sequentially presented information (e.g., Hasher and
Zacks, 1984) or through heuristic inferences from aggregated
information (e.g., representativeness heuristic, Kahneman and
Tversky, 1974).
Which type of evidence should we call upon to help us decide
whether people are Bayesians or not? Both implicit and explicit
processes are relevant for assessing this ability. Having Bayesian
eyes, hands and minds is arguably important for survival. Yet,
our environment has changed dramatically in the Twentieth
century—it became crowded with explicit aggregated statistical
information. Learning from described aggregated information
condenses the learning process compared with learning from
experience. Imagine, for example, an experienced UK physician
relocating to Nigeria. Her experience would provide her with
an adequate knowledge of the disease base rates, sensitivity
and specificity of medical tests within the UK population;
however her experience may not be applicable or may even be
deleterious in Nigeria given that those pieces of information may
differ. The doctor would greatly benefit from reading explicit
aggregated statistical information on base rates of diseases,
sensitivity and specificity of medical tests in the local population
to avoid making errors and the long learning process based on
personal experience. Most importantly, she should be able to
integrate this information into her diagnostic judgments when
facing a given set of symptoms in a patient in Nigeria. More
generally, in their probability-laden environment, all people (not
just physicians) may come across a lot of problems similar
to Bayesian textbook problems, of which cancer or prenatal
screening are just examples (e.g., Navarrete et al., 2014). It is
clear, therefore, that we should focus on improving the explicit
processes that underpin Bayesian reasoning as a problem-solving
ability.
Bayesian Problem-solving
Although the processes involved in solving Bayesian textbook
problems resemble the processes involved in solving other
mathematical problems, research on Bayesian reasoning has
evolved in parallel to the research on problem solving. Reframing
processes involved in Bayesian textbook reasoning in terms
of the processes examined in the problem-solving literature
can benefit Bayesian reasoning research efforts. The problem-
solving literature not only extends the sound methodological
toolkit to explore underpinning mental processes (e.g., thinking
aloud protocols), but it also offers alternative concepts enacting
novel insights, different explanations and more elaborate models
generating deeper understanding of Bayesian problem-solving.
We outline three examples of such theoretical benefits in the
context of facilitating Bayesian problem-solving.
First, applying problem-solving concepts to Bayesian
reasoning offers a novel and productive perspective. For
example, we could think of Bayesian textbook problems in a
problem-solving framework as a combination of insight and
analytical problems. Typically, the problem-solving literature
distinguishes two classes of problems: analytical and insight
problems (Gilhooly and Murphy, 2005). With analytical
problems, people can work out an incremental solution and
rarely experience an Aha! moment in the process. Consider,
for instance, this multi-digit addition problem: “Sum up
the following numbers: 13, 27, 12, 32, 25, 11”; participants
announcing an answer rarely do so with Eureka glee (although
they might experience relief). With insight problems, people
have to overcome an initial impasse to reach a completely new
way of thinking about the problem; they need to transform
the initial problem representation into a new representation
which will lead them to the goal state. Consider, for instance,
the following problem: “Place 17 animals in 4 enclosures in
such a manner that there will be an odd number of animals in
each enclosure” (adapted from Metcalfe and Wiebe, 1987). You
probably try 17/4 and it did not work: The problem masquerades
as an arithmetic puzzle. However, in contrast to an analytic
problem, the initial problem presentation cannot be transformed
step-by-step to a solution (in this case the solution involves
overlapping sets). This distinction suggests that decomposing the
question of “What facilitates Bayesian reasoning?” into “What
facilitates the insight?” and “What facilitates the computation?”
will pave the way for better understanding what factors facilitate
the problem-structure understanding and what factors facilitate
the computational operations in Bayesian problem-solving (see
also Johnson and Tubau, 2015).
Second, rephrasing Bayesian reasoning as a form of problem-
solving offers different explanations of the processes implicated,
for example, those involved in representational training (e.g.,
Sedlmeier and Gigerenzer, 2001; Mandel, 2015; Sirota et al.,
2015a). In representational training, participants learn to
transform the statistical format representation of a problem—
they learn to translate single-event probabilities into natural
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frequencies. For example, the statements “a 1% probability that a
woman has breast cancer” and “if a woman has cancer then there
is an 80% probability that she will get a positive mammogram”
are translated as “10 out of every 1000 women have breast cancer”
and “8 out of the 10 who have breast cancer will get a positive
mammogram.” The problem-solving approach posits that the
underlying mechanism of such representational training consists
of the acquisition of an appropriate problem representation—a
nested-sets representation of the Bayesian problem, regardless
of frequencies or probabilistic information contained in such
problem—during the learning phase, which is then transferred
to similar problems in the testing phase (for evidence see Sirota
et al., 2015a). This goes beyond the default explanation that
participants translated single-event probabilities into natural
frequencies (Sedlmeier and Gigerenzer, 2001) and it accounts
for the training success in terms of the specific mental processes
involved in problem representation learning and its transfer (for
the importance of a good representation in different problems
of a belief revision not depending on natural frequencies, see
Mandel, 2014).
Third, recruiting problem-solving models offers a better
understanding of well-known effects in Bayesian reasoning than
we currently have, for example, the format effect. Statistical
formats such as natural frequencies represent probably the most
cost-effective (and the most discussed) tool to facilitate Bayesian
problem-solving, given that visual aids offer mixed evidence
of their effectiveness (e.g., Cosmides and Tooby, 1996; Sirota
et al., 2014b). Natural frequencies enhance Bayesian problem-
solving when compared with formats involving normalization
such as probability formats (e.g., Gigerenzer and Hoffrage,
1995; Cosmides and Tooby, 1996; Barbey and Sloman, 2007).
Natural frequencies, introduced by Kleiter (1994), integrate
the base-rate information in their structure making the base-
rate information per se redundant. For example, the statement
“8 women out of the 10 who have breast cancer will get a
positive mammogram” includes the base-rate information of
the 10 (out of 1000) women with cancer from our previous
example.
According to the general framework of mathematical verbal
problem solving (Kintsch and Greeno, 1985; Kintsch, 1988),
which integrates formal mathematical and linguistic knowledge,
two processes should be differentiated here: the processes
involved in representing the problem and those involved in
producing a solution (for specific approaches to probability
representation, see Johnson-Laird et al., 1999; Mandel, 2008).
In the problem representation phase, a mental representation
is constructed from the text that triggers available knowledge
schemas stored in long-term memory. Familiar cues in the
text activate a correct mental representation of the problem
more easily than unfamiliar or misleading ones; this enables
an easier integration with existing knowledge. In the problem
solution phase, rules or strategies corresponding to the problem
representation are implemented. We suggest that the facilitative
effect of natural frequencies in Bayesian inference problems is
due to a similar process. A wording of the task with frequencies
(e.g., explicit set reference language such as “10 out of the
remaining 90”)—not the numerical format by itself—may trigger
a representation of the problem as nested sets, while a wording of
the task with probabilities which conceal the nested set structure
due to normalizing, does not. Such an explanation casts natural
frequencies as a familiar format rather than a privileged one.
Some authors view natural frequencies as a privileged format
because they are processed by a specialized frequency-coding
mechanism shaped by evolutionary forces (Gigerenzer and
Hoffrage, 1995). If true (and some specific conditions are fulfilled,
Barrett et al., 2006) then processing of a privileged format should
not be cognitively demanding at all or at least less cognitively
demanding than processing of a computationally equivalent
and equally familiar format (e.g., Cosmides and Tooby, 1996).
It means, for instance, that measures of cognitive capacity
should not be predictive of performance in Bayesian reasoning.
However, several recent studies have provided evidence rebutting
the claim of easier processing of natural frequencies (Sirota and
Juanchich, 2011; Lesage et al., 2013; Sirota et al., 2014a).
Conclusion
Our environment is laden with statistical information and
demands from people that they successfully solve problems
that are exactly the same as, or similar to, classical Bayesian
textbook problems. Although some brain function appears to
implement Bayesian computations, people’s abilities to solve
Bayesian word problems could still be substantially improved.
We should therefore strive to understand and improve people’s
performance with this kind of problems. We suggest thinking
about the involved processes as processes akin to those engaged
during problem-solving (see also Johnson and Tubau, 2015;
Sirota et al., 2015b). Such a re-classification would not only
resolve contradictions in research on Bayesian inference,
it would also facilitate the application of conceptual and
methodological tools from problem-solving research. It would
allow us to ask what enacts the insight about the problem
structure, what facilitates the relevant computations and how
exactly people implement these processes. It would allow us to
conceptually re-frame observed effects such as representational
training effects. It would also allow us to shed more light on
the underlying processes by utilizing elaborate process-oriented
models developed in this area.
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